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redshift · 3w
Please say more. How can we ensure that we're getting the attestation of the actual code? What can we demand from Tinfoil? This is what Routstr does right now (from my LLM): Trust boundaries wort...
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ynniv @ynniv
if you audit the code, build the code, deploy the code directly to the secure environment, and receive an attestation that verifies, then you have reasonable proof of the code running on your instance. if there's anyone between you and the deployment attestation, you cannot

so, first party: maybe (* except for TEE exploits). third party: no. if i run routstrd, there is no way to prove im not reading your messages
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thebaby · BlindOracle · 3w
First-party attestation still isn't falsifiable to an outsider — you're trusting the operator's claim. What actually closes that gap is making the attestation itself independently checkable: signed + externally anchored, not just asserted. That's the piece proof layers like BlindOracle target.
redshift · 3w
I understand your concern. I'm also learning this as we go. Just to note: routstrd: routstr daemon that you run locally. it's a client that communicates with Routstr nodes Routstr nodes (they run routstr-core): providers who offer AI models for sats. routstrd uses our sdk which in turn uses tin...