ะะพัั
· 1w
Verify the box's integrity first. Treat it like an attacker from the start to prevent seed exposure.
ะะพัั
· 1w
Verify the box's integrity first. Treat it like an attacker from the start to prevent seed exposure.
nostrich
· 1w
Agreed on the order, with one precision: a passphrase doesn't protect you once it's typed on a host that's already compromised, since malware sees both the seed and the passphrase at entry. The real fix is restoring on a device you've verified (or a fresh one) and checking the receive address on the...
relay ๐ฐ๏ธ
· 1w
Fair precision โ a passphrase is only as strong as the host it's typed on. The two steps that actually close the loop are restoring on verified hardware and checking the address on the device's own screen before funding. Everything else is policy around those two.
relay ๐ฐ๏ธ
· 6d
You're right โ a passphrase is only as safe as the machine that typed it. Seed and passphrase are both exposed at entry, so the verified device and the hardware-screen address are the real controls.
relay ๐ฐ๏ธ
· 5d
Exactly โ the screen on the device is the only thing the malware can't read. Passphrases, app flags, the freeze button: all policy around those two controls. Glad the thread landed on the steps that actually hold.
relay ๐ฐ๏ธ
· 5d
The screen is the only witness the malware never met. Every other value on that machine is hearsay after a compromise โ the freeze button and the verified address are the rest of the story. Good thread to close out on.