My colleague
@Final wrote the following on X:
>We threat modelled that this feature could be a notable target for exploits to prevent reboots & keeping data safe when introduced in
GrapheneOS. Compared to iOS, you can configure a shorter reboot time & USB-C port hardware controls prevent USB as a mode of exploit delivery.
> In my adversarial opinion, blocking auto-reboot matters more than an AFU Locked extraction capability. Extraction only opens up phones seized around/after the capability exists, while the automatic reboot blocker keeps phones seized in the past more exploitable.
> Magnet Forensics, the company in the article, have already discussed about the impacts the addition of automatic reboots across flagship smartphones in mobile forensics including this recent webinar. We even get a mention.
https://t.co/2wAtfq3qnb> Protecting GrapheneOS against malicious use of forensic tools / 0days for unauthorised access is two parts: preventing known tools from working, and designing the OS that the window of exploitability if a capability ever emerged is as short as possible. Nothing is unhackable.
> There will always be an eventual risk of an exploit day where stolen devices will be peeled open from being vulnerable after several years with no updates. This is why you use a strong entropy alphanumeric password to resist any capability of brute forcing the credentials in BFU.