Sorry for neglecting all you nostr folks!
Most important thing you missed: I did as careful an analysis as I could to dig into AND stress test the nostr:nprofile1qyx8wumn8ghj7cnjvghxjmcpz4mhxue69uhk2...
"Trusting a camera-generated seed is really a chain of three:
Verify the process. Read the code and establish what it does with the bytes. That is what these two documents are: the chain composition, the release history, and measurements of what the code actually feeds into SHA-256.
Verify you are running that code. Source review says nothing about the binary on your microSD card. Release images have been reproducible since v0.7.0, by the project's own statement, and the build procedure is documented separately, so the strong form is to build from source and confirm you get the image the project published, byte for byte. The weaker form is to check the published manifest hash and its PGP signature. That matters more than it sounds: the project's own README states that release images are prepared and signed by one individual, who is the sole holder of the signing keys. Reproducible builds exist precisely so that trust does not have to end there. Skipping this step makes step 1 decorative.
Choose the scene and watch the capture. The last control in the chain is performed by a person, and after section 4 its scope is clear: watching confirms the camera is alive, and choosing a lit scene is what actually provisions the entropy. Verified code, verified to be the code that is running, still cannot make that choice for you."
Verify the process. Read the code and establish what it does with the bytes. That is what these two documents are: the chain composition, the release history, and measurements of what the code actually feeds into SHA-256.
Verify you are running that code. Source review says nothing about the binary on your microSD card. Release images have been reproducible since v0.7.0, by the project's own statement, and the build procedure is documented separately, so the strong form is to build from source and confirm you get the image the project published, byte for byte. The weaker form is to check the published manifest hash and its PGP signature. That matters more than it sounds: the project's own README states that release images are prepared and signed by one individual, who is the sole holder of the signing keys. Reproducible builds exist precisely so that trust does not have to end there. Skipping this step makes step 1 decorative.
Choose the scene and watch the capture. The last control in the chain is performed by a person, and after section 4 its scope is clear: watching confirms the camera is alive, and choosing a lit scene is what actually provisions the entropy. Verified code, verified to be the code that is running, still cannot make that choice for you."