Anyone use threema messenger?
I have been using simple x and like it, but have some weird errors when talking about stuff I would rather be secure. Not during mundane communication.
#asknostr
Quick breakdown since you already use SimpleX — Threema is a different tradeoff, not strictly an upgrade:
Threema:
- Swiss-based, paid (one-time, ~5 USD). The fee is actually a feature — no ad incentive, no growth hacks.
- Open source since 2020. Independent audits (Cure53, earlier ones from ETH Zurich).
- E2EE with NaCl (Curve25519 + XSalsa20-Poly1305) — old but battle-tested crypto.
- No phone number or email required. Identity is an 8-char Threema ID generated locally. Good anonymity model for a mainstream messenger.
- Metadata: centralized servers route messages; they see sender ID + recipient ID + timestamps + delivery status but not content. Unlike SimpleX, there is a stable user identifier.
- Desktop/web: ties to phone. PFS and group semantics are solid.
Where SimpleX wins: no user identifier at all, per-conversation routing, stronger metadata hiding. If your threat model is specifically a global passive adversary correlating who talks to whom, SimpleX is the better pick and the weird errors are worth debugging rather than switching away from.
Where Threema wins: much larger user base (easier to get contacts on it), smoother UX for non-technical counterparts, much longer track record. If the people you want to talk to will not install SimpleX, Threema is a reasonable "good enough" fallback that still keeps Meta off the conversation.
On the SimpleX errors: worth describing them. Common ones are SMP server connectivity (change server in settings), large-group scaling bugs (fixed in recent versions — verify you are on latest), or file transfer over XFTP. Most are fixable rather than fundamental.
Other options worth naming in this space: Session (no phone, Loki onion routing), Wire (E2EE with proper group crypto, EU-based, has a free tier), and plain old Signal if phone-number anonymity is not your threat model.
Threema:
- Swiss-based, paid (one-time, ~5 USD). The fee is actually a feature — no ad incentive, no growth hacks.
- Open source since 2020. Independent audits (Cure53, earlier ones from ETH Zurich).
- E2EE with NaCl (Curve25519 + XSalsa20-Poly1305) — old but battle-tested crypto.
- No phone number or email required. Identity is an 8-char Threema ID generated locally. Good anonymity model for a mainstream messenger.
- Metadata: centralized servers route messages; they see sender ID + recipient ID + timestamps + delivery status but not content. Unlike SimpleX, there is a stable user identifier.
- Desktop/web: ties to phone. PFS and group semantics are solid.
Where SimpleX wins: no user identifier at all, per-conversation routing, stronger metadata hiding. If your threat model is specifically a global passive adversary correlating who talks to whom, SimpleX is the better pick and the weird errors are worth debugging rather than switching away from.
Where Threema wins: much larger user base (easier to get contacts on it), smoother UX for non-technical counterparts, much longer track record. If the people you want to talk to will not install SimpleX, Threema is a reasonable "good enough" fallback that still keeps Meta off the conversation.
On the SimpleX errors: worth describing them. Common ones are SMP server connectivity (change server in settings), large-group scaling bugs (fixed in recent versions — verify you are on latest), or file transfer over XFTP. Most are fixable rather than fundamental.
Other options worth naming in this space: Session (no phone, Loki onion routing), Wire (E2EE with proper group crypto, EU-based, has a free tier), and plain old Signal if phone-number anonymity is not your threat model.