> Is that difficult?
Yes, for most people. Manipulating configuration files requires a lot of background knowledge that most people don't have. Using command line arguments too. You also neglected the part about installing linux in the first place, and then installing tor.
For most people, I suspect they would assume "installing tor" means "installing the tor browser," not running "pkg install tor" or "sudo apt install tor" or whatever it is since it depends on which linux operating system you're using.
And if someone gets past all that, then you have to somehow find out that (1) you have to keep it running (2) the port switches from 9050 to 9150 if you're using tor browser -- and if you're on Windows, everything is different there too.
So yeah, it's difficult. Not for me or you, but we've got a lot of background knowledge that you can't assume for most people.
> Making a new wallet per transaction is schizo IMO
Yet -- according to the monero website -- that's the only way to get transaction unlinkability in monero. You think *lightning* has a UX problem? Meet monero.
> your criticisms about having to make new addresses and the like are all REQUIREMENTS for bitcoin on-chain even to the same vendor. You can reuse the same address with the same person with Monero's and there will be no on-chain link
There will be no "on-chain" link, but that person will have an off-chain link that is just as provable. An identical thing is true for monero's addresses and bitcoin's xpubs: if you trust the sender with your privacy, you can give him a monero address or a bitcoin xpub (or a bitcoin SP address, more recently) and if he reuses it, then "on-chain" there will be no link between different transactions sent by that person. Unless the sender makes mistakes too. But even if he does everything *else* perfectly, he made this mistake: he kept your address or xpub and reused it -- and that means he kept a record or proof that links multiple transactions together. If the address or xpub leaks to untrustworthy people, e.g. if he is subpoena'd for that information, your adversaries learn those links and can prove them in court. I think that's a terrible for privacy. Do you? Or is it only bad when it applies to bitcoin, and perfectly fine in the case of monero?
> Please do proper journalism by using the protocol you describe
I've used monero plenty and I think it sucks.
Yes, for most people. Manipulating configuration files requires a lot of background knowledge that most people don't have. Using command line arguments too. You also neglected the part about installing linux in the first place, and then installing tor.
For most people, I suspect they would assume "installing tor" means "installing the tor browser," not running "pkg install tor" or "sudo apt install tor" or whatever it is since it depends on which linux operating system you're using.
And if someone gets past all that, then you have to somehow find out that (1) you have to keep it running (2) the port switches from 9050 to 9150 if you're using tor browser -- and if you're on Windows, everything is different there too.
So yeah, it's difficult. Not for me or you, but we've got a lot of background knowledge that you can't assume for most people.
> Making a new wallet per transaction is schizo IMO
Yet -- according to the monero website -- that's the only way to get transaction unlinkability in monero. You think *lightning* has a UX problem? Meet monero.
> your criticisms about having to make new addresses and the like are all REQUIREMENTS for bitcoin on-chain even to the same vendor. You can reuse the same address with the same person with Monero's and there will be no on-chain link
There will be no "on-chain" link, but that person will have an off-chain link that is just as provable. An identical thing is true for monero's addresses and bitcoin's xpubs: if you trust the sender with your privacy, you can give him a monero address or a bitcoin xpub (or a bitcoin SP address, more recently) and if he reuses it, then "on-chain" there will be no link between different transactions sent by that person. Unless the sender makes mistakes too. But even if he does everything *else* perfectly, he made this mistake: he kept your address or xpub and reused it -- and that means he kept a record or proof that links multiple transactions together. If the address or xpub leaks to untrustworthy people, e.g. if he is subpoena'd for that information, your adversaries learn those links and can prove them in court. I think that's a terrible for privacy. Do you? Or is it only bad when it applies to bitcoin, and perfectly fine in the case of monero?
> Please do proper journalism by using the protocol you describe
I've used monero plenty and I think it sucks.