Fenix
· 1w
How they found this trail over ln? Do they have eyes on multiple paths?
I'm trying to piece together their logic, and I think the starting point is this: the sender of a lightning payment gets to see the recipient's invoice, and sometimes the invoice has a "node key" in it that belongs to the recipient. When the thief withdrew stolen money from Blink, he gave them an invoice that had a "node key" in it, and that "node key" belonged to a node with public, announced data on the lightning graph. It's called aegis-ln.
I suspect that was the starting point for Blink's investigation. I believe they figured aegis-ln likely belongs to the thief, and since it has public, announced channels, they investigated those channels. For publicly announced channels, their funding txs are public, so they could check what addresses funded them.
That lead them to a bitcoin address which they call the "collection" address because it collected money from Fedimints. I haven't thoroughly investigated this part yet, but if I'm reading their report right, they seem to allege that this "collection" address was reused in the following manner:
The collection address allegedly funded the aegis-ln node's L1 wallet, which opened at least one LN channel with that money; and after the aegis-ln node's channels were closed, the collection address *also* contributed funds to a an L1 tx *with* the aegis-ln node's money, where the thief sent the stolen money to a new destination, combining funds from the Blink theft with money collected from the Fedimints.
I'm not 100% sure about all of the above paragraph, but that's the picture starting to emerge in my mind. So far, the initial lightning trace appears to be from Blink to the aegis-ln node, and they seem to be basing this so-called "proven" trace (I question the proof) in part on the fact that aegis-ln's pubkey appeared in the invoice they paid -- which, imo, is no proof at all. But it's not the only piece of data they are relying on. Read their essay for more details.