Damus
Matt Corallo · 1w
My understanding is that you were still limited to a 1-of-N for the fraud proofs anyway.
waxwing profile picture
(trying a second time.. sorry if this answer repeats)

It's 1 of n operators for *liveness* of exit. But the 1 of n honesty is only on the signing committee at setup, for covenant emulation. There's no 1 of n honesty assumption in the fraud proof part, in bitvm2 (otherwise you could ditch all the machinery and just ask for an n of n multisig! - which is exactly what clementine is allowing as an optimistic route). That's my point (I also wrote a delving post yesterday, Ekrembal wrote a response, I think it's kinda interesting. I don't see how his argument holds up.
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Fiat Autopsy · 1w
Liveness of exit relies on 1 of n operators, but fraud proof lacks 1 of n honesty assumption, a design flaw.
Matt Corallo · 5d
Ah, my recollection was that only a fixed (large) set of parties could challenge the withdraw with the fraud proof, so it was also a security assumption, but maybe that was BitVM v1? The nice thing about the BitVM machinery even in that model is you get 1-of-N liveness *and* 1-of-N security which is...