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Sjors Provoost · 1d
nostr:npub1cev2qfuqv5s9jm5a6yvhc8ne8cdl9mh459m5g8zz759s7pw9fayqnketlq
aj · 13h
So that it's easy to build up a backlog and get fee pressure, without having to make 4x the spam txs.
waxwing profile picture
Excellent summary. I think the final paragraph is the most important, but also: at least in theory, any particular round with a central coordinator and anonymous counterparty, cannot be guaranteed to not be Sybiled by the coordinator.

With any form of coordination, that's possible; indeed that was a common early critique of Joinmarket, and even imposing anti-Sybil style costs doesn't remove that risk, either.

The reason I always saw that risk as worse with a central coordinator was the standard CPOF arguments.

Let's not forget that a central coordinator offers big advantages, too.

m0wer · 3d
In many cases the default variance is not enough to overlap with any other maker (and even when it is, the anonymity set might not be great). When several maker do overlap in fees, randomization becomes "harmful" IMO. Because it then helps track an individual maker by following their "randomly uniq...
Matt Corallo · 3d
Yes, *lighting* has good sender privacy. Some people prefer to use custodial services which don’t. Not entirely sure you can blame LN for that? Though even for such services you can do client-side ...
waxwing profile picture
Clearly that's the pure perspective, but I'll keep harping on this point: a model like Phoenix where you don't have privacy from Phoenix is absolutely different from a model like onchain payments. It fits closer to, and is better than, what people are (unconsciously) used to: when they use a bank card they know the bank knows all their transactions, and they accept that tradeoff (mostly because they have no choice to be fair!). I'm not saying a CPOF isn't a problem; such things will always come back to bite you eventually, if they get big enough. But that tradeoff is not even close to being a bad tradeoff with the current status quo, and it is emphatically a better privacy model than the vast majority of others (and I suppose it can still get better). So: self custody, privacy w.r.t. merchant[1] but not service provider, strictly better than bank money: no self custody, privacy w.r.t merchant but not service provider.

[1] just means they don't see your financial history

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waxwing · 3d
That's the answer I wanted to make to nostr:nprofile1qqsyvrp9u6p0mfur9dfdru3d853tx9mdjuhkphxuxgfwmryja7zsvhqpzpmhxue69uhkummnw3ezumt0d5hszythwden5te0dehhxarj9emkjmn99ue6qm68 more than nostr:nprofile1qqsr6tj32zrfn7v0pu4aheaytdnnc6rluepq73ndc2tdjzus34gat9qpp4mhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mqpramhxue69uhkummnw3ez6...
waxwing profile picture
Fabian Jahr put out a concrete proposal for DahLIAS!

https://github.com/fjahr/bips/blob/4b34e86d0040edad6cba3f7518b33472a11ebeaf/bip-XXXX.mediawiki

This is a CISA proposal with a security proof. I was hoping there'd be more comments on DahLIAS by now, but having read it myself (the paper, not this BIP, yet) I think it's solid; the only part I didn't like, I was convinced by the authors is just aesthetics.

Drag yourself away from PQC panic or bip110 panic, if you dare 😄

2
Corey San Diego · 3d
This doesnt mention if it would require a hard or soft fork but it does right?
/dev/fd0 · 3d
Let's consolidate all inputs to degrade privacy but save some fees.
Vitor Pamplona · 4d
Only if you run your own node in an infrastructure that is not tracking you on transport.