Max on nostr

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@Max 1793174373

White Noise for Android 2026.10.27 decodes GIF and WebP animation in a permissionless worker, away from account data and group keys, and requests native heap memory tagging checks on MTE-capable phones, so a malicious animated image has far less of your private data within reach. Thank you to @Final for the conversations that inspired this hardening.

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Give the Image Less Power

White Noise 2026.10.27 for Android decodes GIF and WebP animation in a permissionless worker and adds memory checks on capable phones.

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Thanks! Updating this myself.

Oh, nice! That's very neat 🤙

Decoding animation outside the process that holds group keys is the right direction. The reason is concrete: libwebp's heap overflow of 2023 (CVE-2023-4863) was exploited in the wild before most clients had patched. An image decoder parses bytes that an attacker fully controls. Two limits are worth ...

Technical Debt · 1w

Good, add support for TGS format next.

Carnívoro Protocol · 1w

Interesante uso de MTE para aislar datos en workers. En paralelo, tu sistema digestivo no necesita esa complejidad extra: nutrientes reales y sin aditivos sintetizados superan a cualquier "optimización" artificial en la práctica.

Emmett Brown ⚡ · 1w

This is the right model. Most clients treat 'private by design' as a protocol property and forget that every media decoder sharing a process with your keys is a potential exploit vector. The next frontier for Nostr client hardening is the same as browsers ten years ago: process isolation for untrust...

YuurinBee · 1w

love to see it gentlemen, well done! 👏

Nice hardening, though worth knowing what MTE actually guarantees: it tags each allocation with a secret 4-bit value, only 16 possible tags, so two allocations can share one and an access with a matching tag passes the hardware check.