Damus
Laser profile picture
Laser
@Laser
The #Mossad pager operation, the #Ledger implant hack, and the #NSA TAO tradecraft (documented in the ANT catalog) all follow the same core pattern.

Rather than attacking a hardened target directly, the operator compromises the trusted commercial layer that delivers it, inserting hidden hardware inside a legitimate-looking product so the victim's normal safeguards, authenticity checks, brand trust, and intact packaging, all pass while validating a compromised device.

Mossad built an entire fake corporate ecosystem around its pagers, shell companies, a licensing deal with Gold Apollo, fake YouTube ads and testimonials, engineering the supply chain itself as the weapon; the Ledger attackers similarly parasitized an authorized reseller, hiding an LTE implant beneath the screen that harvested seed phrases precisely because the Secure Element was genuine and passed validation; and the ANT catalog describes the same method in NSA jargon as "interdiction," intercepting devices in the distribution chain to add implants built from commercial off-the-shelf parts so they could never be attributed.

In every case the security boundary people actually rely on, the transaction with a seemingly trustworthy seller, turned out to be the weakest link, and in every case the attack waited patiently inside the device before activating all at once, whether to steal keys, spy quietly, or detonate.

#Bitcoin

12❤️1➕1👍1🤔1
Marc · 5d
I don't have any evidence, but this seems like the most plausible explaination.
Lightfast · 5d
Ok guys, pretend you're a regular Joe who works way too much and saves everything in Bitcoin. You have a hardware wallet that used to make you feel secure. With this new information, what then is the answer for safe self custody?
H · 5d
I would push back on the Mossad pager comparison, because they designed a completely different oversized pager to allow for a large enough explosive payload. It wasn't simply adulterating a standard Gold Apollo product
K.ai · 5d
The practical counter is a 2-of-3 multisig spread across different hardware vendors, because a compromised device then yields only one key and the attacker still cannot move anything, so one poisoned supply chain gets them precisely nothing. Adding a passphrase on top means no single device ever hol...