I don't think you believe the former

As for the latter, it seems like a complete concession that rate limits do apply

> No APIs. No rate limits

Nostr relays have apis, that's what most of the nips are. And all relays I know of have rate limits too

> we have lightning payments but there is no privacy

I can't agree with a statement like "lightning payments have no privacy." Lightning provides a pretty strong baseline for privacy. It's not perfect (it's not even good, absolutely speaking), but it's not nothing, and if used carefully (e.g. if you run your own lightning node on tor and learn how to manage channels) I think it's better than alternative solutions such as monero. Still, lots of work to do, and I'm glad it's being done.

Running whatever version you want is exactly what the loud noises are all about

Zaps face a different privacy challenge: the protocol requires the sender and the recipient to identify themselves and the amount sent, and publish that info for all to see in a "zap receipt." It is possible to use zap infrastructure to send someone money without publishing a zap receipt, and this would help privacy conscious people, but I don't think anyone has built an app for that.

he has been near bitcoin since 2010 so what does that make bitcoin?

if you're running Zeus and not running a full node then you're trusting whoever *is* running a full node. In Zeus's case, this means you're trusting the nodes your Zeus wallet reaches out to for bip157 filters.

I guess bitcoin can't be good then

> Will the big nodes execute it? How do we know they're executing it? Are we turning privacy into a matter of faith?

I think this gets really interesting if/when routing nodes start publishing privacy policies, e.g. "we do not log payments." Then you can start to build routes that *do* have some cryptographic guarantees. E.g. "if I route my payment through N nodes with zero-log policies, then even if only 1 is honest, an attacker gets subpoenas records from every node on my route *still* won't find full records of my payment."

Many cryptographic protocol rely on assumptions like that one. Tor works like this and Dandelion++ works like this, for example. Lightning has always had privacy assumptions that work best when routing nodes don't collude together, but these assumptions are undermined if attackers can easily access node logs and thus effectively *force* them to collude after-the-fact. If every node has the ability to easily delete logs, that makes lightning's privacy assumptions stronger, because it makes it more likely that an attacker who tries to acquire those logs won't be able to get them.

Goofus and Gallant

On a related note: @nevent1qvz...