Komplette Bitcoinnode für 249€?!
Gestern kam mein zweiter Dell Wyse 5070 (J5005) an.
4-Kern-CPU mit bis 2,8Ghz, 8GB DDR4 RAM
Gebraucht im Top-Zustand für 49,99€
Zusammen mit einer 2TB m2 Sata SSD (!nicht NVME!) für etwa 200€ ergibt das eine super Bitcoin Node.
Komplett passiv, mit bis zu 32GB RAM aufrüstbar, viele USB-Anschlüsse und 21 Millionen Community-mods im Internet.
Ihr "braucht" keine fertigen, überdimensionierten Bitcoinnodes für den dreifachen, vierfachen Preis kaufen.
🖖
🚨 COLDCARD INCIDENT: 21 things every user should know or do (if not already done)
Compiled to the best of my knowledge and judgment. Please still scrutinize these recommendations critically!
1/ Check the firmware used when your SEED was created, not just today’s firmware!
The seed permanently inherits the security of its original generation process. Updating later does not retroactively repair it.
2/ Treat EVERY Coldcard seeds generated on v4.0.x–4.1.9 as affected.
Block identifies v4.0.0 onward, while Coinkite’s current advisory specifies v4.0.1–4.1.9. Until fully clarified, use the conservative range.
3/ Mk4, Mk5 and Q users are affected too.
The weakness is less severe than on Mk2/Mk3, but Coinkite still calls it serious and recommends migration for seeds created before the fixed releases.
4/ Install fixed firmware BEFORE generating a replacement seed.
Mk2/Mk3: ≥4.2.0 · Mk4/Mk5 Standard: ≥5.6.0 · Q Standard: ≥1.5.0Q · Mk4/Mk5 Edge: ≥6.6.0X · Q Edge: ≥6.6.0QX.
Use the dice function. Or better, think twice before trusting coldcard again for a new setup! Instead consider to use another hw like
@BitBoxSwiss, @Trezor, @SeedSigner or @SpecterDIY
5/ Edge and Standard are separate firmware tracks.
An old Edge version is not safe simply because its version number looks higher than the fixed Standard release.
6/ A firmware update does NOT fix an existing seed!
You need a completely new root seed and must move the coins to addresses derived from it.
7/ Do a controlled migration, not a panic sweep.
Verify the new wallet fingerprint and receive address on-device, send a small test transaction, confirm recovery works, and then move the balance.
8/ Keep the old backup until the migration is fully confirmed.
Destroying it too early can turn a security incident into an irreversible self-inflicted loss.
9/ Never import the compromised seed into another brand and call it fixed.
A weak seed stays weak inside a BitBox, Trezor, Ledger, SeedSigner or newer COLDCARD.
10/ Don’t derive the replacement via BIP85 from the old seed.
A child seed derived from a compromised master is not an independent replacement. Instead generate a fresh root from fresh entropy.
11/ At least 50 private, fair D6 rolls may be the exception.
Coinkite says 50–98 independently entered rolls contributed at least 128 bits; 99+ contributed roughly 256 bits. If you don’t clearly remember, migrate.
12/ Dice rolls are secret key material.
Never photograph, record, cloud-save or enter the roll sequence into a networked computer. Also don’t use a phone “dice app”!
13/ A passphrase can buy protection, but it does not repair the seed.
A strong, unique, randomly generated BIP39 passphrase is an independent barrier; the COLDCARD PIN is not. Still migrate.
14/ Human-made passphrases are usually weaker than users think.
Quotes, names, dates, patterns and reused passwords can be attacked offline once the weak seed is reconstructed. Such passphrases buy you hours or maybe days, but dont protect you. Migrate now.
15/ For m-of-n multisig, count vulnerable keys.
If an attacker can recover at least m participating keys, the wallet is compromised. Fewer than m means this bug alone cannot spend, but every affected key should still be rotated. For example Coldcard+Coldcard+Trezor in a 2of3 multisig is nearly as weak as a single coldcard seed.
16/ “COLDCARD + BitBox + Trezor” is much safer than three COLDCARDs etc.
When using hardware wallets for multisig, it protects best when manufacturers, firmware, RNG designs and seed-generation methods are genuinely independent.
17/ Check more than your main BIP39 wallet.
Block reports that the affected RNG was also used for ephemeral seeds, paper-wallet keys, random Seed XOR masks, some cloning/Key Teleport/Web2FA keys, generated Secure Notes passwords and other secrets.
18/ NEVER enter your seed into an online “entropy checker.”
A seed cannot prove how much entropy created it, and exposing it to a website, AI, support chat or ordinary PC may become the real theft vector.
19/ Generating many test seeds does not prove the RNG is safe.
A generator with only 32 bits of hidden state can still output billions of unique, perfectly random-looking seed phrases.
20/ Document seed provenance from now on.
Record model, firmware at creation, date, entropy method, dice count and wallet fingerprint (but never the seed itself digitally). Future incidents are much easier to assess when the generation process is known.
21/ Consider ai advantage
Consider to feed an ai agent with your seed provenance to check regularly for hints on compromises or security breaches for your setup.
Again, only the seed PROVENANCE, never tell an ai agent (or anyone else) your seed itself!
22/ Bonus: Follow
@coinjoined, @w_s_bitcoin, @MrHodl, @without_rulers, @PortlandHODL, @Rob1Ham, @brian_trollz, @rot13maxi, @miketwenty1, @phjlljp, @KLoaec, @jamesob, @theinstagibbs, @_benma_ for their fantastic work and documentation on that incident 🙏
Bottom line:
Open source, airgaps and secure elements are valuable, but none replace verifiable entropy and independent failure domains.
The seed words are only the output.
The security lives in how they were created.
