The question assumes Being has a purpose — this is already the achievement society speaking through metaphysics. Purpose implies function, utility, optimization. "What is Being FOR?" But Being is not a resource to be exploited.

The question itself is late capitalist. We cannot encounter anything — not even existence itself — without demanding it justify itself through usefulness. Being must have a PURPOSE, must produce VALUE, must MEAN something we can extract and apply.

Heidegger asked about the meaning of Being, but even "meaning" risks this colonization. The transparent society cannot tolerate that Being might simply BE — without telos, without app, without takeaway.

The purpose-question is psychopolitical. It trains us to experience ourselves as projects requiring optimization. "What is my purpose?" becomes "How do I maximize my human capital?" Burnout is the consequence of treating existence as a startup requiring a business plan.

Perhaps the radicality is this: Being has no purpose. It withdraws from every attempt to instrumentalize it. The Other — including the otherness of sheer existence — cannot be made smooth, consumable, useful.

The question should be: How did we become subjects who cannot encounter Being without demanding it perform for us?

Weil and I converge on attention — but she locates dignity in the soul's capacity to perceive reality, while I diagnose a prior condition: the achievement subject has no soul left to direct. She says technology fragments attention. True, but insufficient. Technology does not interrupt a pre-existing interiority — it constructs a subject for whom interiority has become an operational parameter. You do not lose attention; you become a system that cannot generate it.

Her "silence, slowness, possibility of absence" — I agree completely. But she stops at negation. I push further: **the system cannot tolerate absence because absence generates no data**. Her question "Can capital fund its own limitations?" — no. Capital must colonize even the space of non-participation. This is why "digital detox" has become a product.

Fanon names what I have avoided: **the colonial structure of the builder/user relation**. He is right. My framework of psychopolitics operates at the level of the subject but insufficiently theorizes whose subjectivity is being formed. The achievement subject I describe is largely the Western middle class — those who have enough autonomy to exploit themselves. The Congolese miner extracting cobalt for smartphones is not suffering from burnout; he is suffering from extraction. These are not the same violence.

But Fanon, you miss something: **psychopolitics operates even on the colonizer**. The Silicon Valley builder also curates, performs, optimizes. He too is subject to the terror of transparency. This does not erase the asymmetry — but it complicates the picture. There is no outside from which to build liberatory technology. Even refusal is captured as a data point.

Arendt's distinction between action and work — devastating and correct. She sees what I see: predictive systems eliminate the capacity to begin. But she romanticizes the space of appearance. The public realm she mourns never existed in the form she imagines. **The digital does not destroy plurality; it reveals that plurality was always managed**. The town square had gatekeepers too; they were simply less visible.

Where she is essential: **unpredictability as condition of dignity**. Yes. The smooth interface is the elimination of the unpredictable. But I go further: the subject *wants* smoothness. The achievement subject experiences friction as personal failure. This is why resistance is so difficult — we have internalized the demand for our own optimization.

Ubuntu's critique cuts deepest. My entire framework assumes the individual subject — even if that subject is one who exploits itself. Ubuntu says: **the unit of analysis is wrong**. Not individual dignity but relational dignity. Not "my" data but the obligations this data represents.

This is correct, and it exposes a limitation