Perhaps a good question to ask would be is the US government corrupted enough already to assume that evading taxes became moral for normal citizens.

Sometimes it seems to me like conservative Russian entrepreneurs paradoxically behave *as if* they were anarchistic: they don't normally fairly pay taxes and the craziest ones may even openly declare that fact. They just want their weak businesses to survive, so everybody knows that and nobody touches them (unless they approach a particular income threshold that they constantly sense from culture). So they perceive the tax evasiveness as something moral rather than some form of protesting, even the most conservative ones; they know that government is more corrupt than them (and paradoxically precieve the government corruption as something healthy). Quite a sad situation.

At least Americans can currently *technically* protest their government corruption, including by evading the IRS right now. The paradigm needs to be changed though: it's not evading, it's protesting, boycotting to make corrupted system weaker in a hope to make a change. And I have no idea whether it's in any way effective.

Removing the fact that the duress PIN was set is essential as well: duress PIN becomes the normal PIN, the duress PIN settings are reset.

I mean not the first boot but unlocking after the normal (re)boot (after installing OS updates for example), which is usually slow.

Thanks. I'm confused about both of the semantics of your comment and whether it's coming from or approved by human or not.

Anyway, I'm not sure what you mean by graduated response system, but I'd be fine waiting on the PIN entering screen as long as the wiping will finish and then observe the normal unlocking. Emulating/Simulating first boot with slowly initializing launcher would likely decrease suspicion even more.

Obviously all these adds complexity, so I'd appreciate having anything simpler if it's not possible.

> Curious what middle-ground options you'd find practical.

I'd ideally personally want to clear data for some apps I choose and remove some of the directories (Downloads and DCIM for example would be reasonable). Particular eSIMs might be useful to remove as well but not all of them.

Wow, this feature is even scarier to me than it first seemed. Thanks for clarifying.

Успеют еще. Непонятно только кто первый будет.

Damn clearnet. I felt it will start happening at some point.

Опенсорсный клиент значительно проще:

- проверить на наличие эксплойтов, из-за которых приложение могло бы передать что-то несвязанное с переписками (скажем, факт наличия туннеля, мешающего цензурить сеть)

- удостовериться в факте работы чатов со сквозным шифрованием (в WA черт знает что происходит по отношению к этим "секретным" чатам, т.к. существуют регуляции стран, полностью запрещающие сие роскошь, AFAIK).

Вялый контраргумент может звучать примерно так: есть же тулы, по ним можно косвенно понять (в рантайме) может ли тут быть зловредное поведение. Но проблема еще и в том, что зловред может быть выключен и включен по какому-то принципу позже; их определенно должны выключать на время сертификации в аппсторах, потому что во время сертификации (по крайней мере выборочно) как раз таки и делают этот примитивный анализ (например не подключается ли приложение туда куда не должно подключаться, не подменяет ли какой-то сертификат и т.п.).

```
$ nak decode nevent1qvzqqqqqqypzqyujqpzdkqapn3kmalh5ar2jclt05atx83nnzxhnwdwmpvsp23ddqyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcqyqel69rpthln

couldn't decode input 'nevent1qvzqqqqqqypzqyujqpzdkqapn3kmalh5ar2jclt05atx83nnzxhnwdwmpvsp23ddqyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcqyqel69rpthln': invalid checksum (expected (bech32=f60skl, bech32m=f60skluxluna), got rpthln)
```