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rafael_xmr · 1d
how could OpenAI and Anthropic not review my terrible commit from 2021, I thought it was fine because it "just runs"!!? nostr:nevent1qqs2737vgrwxpmac3adk78q62ls53rrela3keytley4z9cjczzpextgpzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerfw36x7tnsw43z7q3qq3sle0kvfsehgsuexttt3ugjd8xdklxfwwkh559wxckmzddywnwsxpqqqqqqzjz7r2t
TheFuzzStone profile picture
"Don't trust, verify" feels especially relevant in the modern world of LLMs.

It is cheaper to verify the code of the wallet you use yourself, than to lose money later.
TheFuzzStone profile picture
He is partially right.

A cryptographic generator based on hardware noise provides more entropy, is faster, and is free from human errors like biased dice and/or uneven surfaces, etc.

The only scenario where manual entropy saves you is when the hardware RNG is compromised or weak (like the recent Coldcard incident).

In all other attacks firmware substitution, backdoors in the conversion code, side-channel leaks, or malicious signing logic - dice are useless because the device sees the final seed anyway.

To say "a passphrase is useless" is too categorical.

A written passphrase is not "just another seed", but a separate factor: it protects against the physical theft of a seed copy (an attacker with the seed phrase but without the passphrase will end up with an empty wallet) and allows for the use of decoy wallets.

Yes, it must be stored separately, and yes, human-generated passwords have low entropy.

But we have offline password managers like KeePassXC, so, "either memorize it or it's pointless" is a false dichotomy: nothing stops you from generating a decent passphrase using KeePassXC and storing it in a different location than the seed.

If someone says the problem is with the master password for KeePassXC itself, then I don't know what to say to people who can't come up with even one decent password of their head.

The idea of "multi-vendor multi-sig" sounds... interesting.

2-of-3 multisig:

key_1: hardware wallet from vendor A;
key_2: hardware wallet from vendor B;
key_3: either a third hardware wallet, a SeedSigner on an air-gapped device, or a paper backup;

What does this approach entail? -> You need to back up more things.

In addition to 3 seeds, you need to save the wallet descriptor (all three xpub keys, key order and derivation paths).

It is critical specifically when one key is lost. With all 3 seeds the coordinator will restore the wallet even without the descriptor, but with 2 seeds and no descriptor = it's impossible.

A copy of the descriptor is kept with each seed copy.
Its leakage does not steal money, but it does reveal all addresses and balances - it needs to be hidden just as carefully.

https://x.com/BitPaine/status/2084046152044007912
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TheFuzzStone profile picture
Every Bitcoin wallet (especially hardware ones) now claims to be better than Coldcard and that everything is fine with them.

Start the timer until the next vulnerability.

In the current crypto community, the ratio of marketers to cypherpunks is clearly not in favor of the latter.
O Tristão · 1d
ThinkPads are nice but I get you