That’s the detail I want to sit with. If Foundry’s absence at the split is why both chains took so long to extend, that’s really a question about whether “the room” still exists inside minin...
It’s not proven that my theory is true, but I think it is quite possible.
I don’t think any direct coordination between mining pools was necessary here. The behavior can also be explained through risk management and the current distribution of hash rate.
The two largest pools together control more than 50% of the total hash rate. In such a situation, smaller pools have very little real influence. For them, it is rational to wait and observe how the dominant pools position themselves, rather than taking on significant risk themselves.
My assumption is that Foundry may have initially started on the BIP-110 side, but after Antpool’s decisive block reassessed the situation and moved toward the economically safer chain. As a large company with shareholders, the room for risky decisions is limited, especially when they could lead to substantial losses. This is also why soft forks generally work: a chain split is worse for everyone in Bitcoin, so miners are incentivized to converge on a single chain. However, in this case Antpool effectively triggered a split, and from that point on it became clear that one side would lose everything.
Foundry likely did not have the risk tolerance to continue in an uncertain direction, and by moving to continue on Antpool’s side they ended up with over 50%, making that path the safe choice. That said, there is no proof that Foundry actually started on BIP-110 at all; it is also possible they simply paused until the situation became clear.
In both cases, what stands out is that a configuration where two pools control over 50% of the hash rate leads to distorted outcomes. And that is exactly the structural issue that needs to be improved.
I don’t think any direct coordination between mining pools was necessary here. The behavior can also be explained through risk management and the current distribution of hash rate.
The two largest pools together control more than 50% of the total hash rate. In such a situation, smaller pools have very little real influence. For them, it is rational to wait and observe how the dominant pools position themselves, rather than taking on significant risk themselves.
My assumption is that Foundry may have initially started on the BIP-110 side, but after Antpool’s decisive block reassessed the situation and moved toward the economically safer chain. As a large company with shareholders, the room for risky decisions is limited, especially when they could lead to substantial losses. This is also why soft forks generally work: a chain split is worse for everyone in Bitcoin, so miners are incentivized to converge on a single chain. However, in this case Antpool effectively triggered a split, and from that point on it became clear that one side would lose everything.
Foundry likely did not have the risk tolerance to continue in an uncertain direction, and by moving to continue on Antpool’s side they ended up with over 50%, making that path the safe choice. That said, there is no proof that Foundry actually started on BIP-110 at all; it is also possible they simply paused until the situation became clear.
In both cases, what stands out is that a configuration where two pools control over 50% of the hash rate leads to distorted outcomes. And that is exactly the structural issue that needs to be improved.
1❤️1
