For sure! From malicious PRs being merged, OS level code injections, supply chain “attacks”, exploits being ignored for years, exploits that de-anonymize and even more.
Check out these issues, PR...
Fable's tldr:
Three of the four items hold up as real marks against the project, one is overstated, and the note's "malicious PRs being merged" claim isn't supported by anything it cites. Item by item:
**Issue #14410 (Mar 16, 2026)**: OS command injection in the URL opener on Linux/macOS. The URL opener builds a shell command by string-concatenating an attacker-controlled URL into xdg-open/open and then executes it through sh -c with no escaping, reachable by pasting a crafted coordinator connection string and clicking "Read More". Bad mark: a shell-out with unescaped input in a privacy wallet, found by Ledger's automated Donjon scanner rather than the team. Mitigating: lontivero merged the fix (#14411) the same day, and it needs user interaction. [github](https://github.com/WalletWasabi/WalletWasabi/issues/14410)
**Issue #5533 (Apr 2021 to Jul 2026)**: filed by Yuval Kogman, one of WabiSabi's designers. Clients verified ownership proofs against a scriptPubKey the coordinator itself supplied, so a coordinator could invent UTXOs, forge proofs, and run tagging or sybil attacks. Stale-botted three times in 2021, auto-closed, reopened, then sat for five years until #14886 (merged Jul 30, 2026) added verification of a random 10% of inputs, and only when an RPC node is connected. Light clients still don't verify. Kogman's reaction on the fix: "wow, amazing that suddenly this became possible".
**PR #14333 (Feb 2026, still a draft)**: not malicious, the opposite. A defensive, client-only mitigation for round-ID equivocation (coordinator feeds each Tor circuit different round parameters, links inputs, anonymity set drops to 1), from Kogman's bitcoindev analysis. Reviewed by Carti-it, tested by Kruwed, false positives fixed. Then lontivero: "This PR is not a priority and it is a bit risky", parked as draft on Mar 3. Kukks shipped the same idea in Kompaktor. Related #14771 (Jul 2026): the maintainer closed a blame-round attack report in 20 minutes as a non-issue, reopened it two days later after Carti-it showed clients don't check blame-round inputs. Partial fix in #14786; m0wer notes the core problem (all clients seeing the same preceding round) is still open and lists six earlier attempts that went nowhere.
**Discussion #13249 (Jul 2024)**, listed twice in the note: the team's own incident disclosure. (1) L7 DDoS on free coordinators. (2) The Windows installer Wasabi-2.0.8.1.msi on GitHub Releases was swapped for a different file via a compromised write-access account. Caught by the external BinaryWatch bot, not internally. Nobody kept a copy, so the payload was never analyzed. (3) A coordinator-fee vulnerability the team admits it already knew about, left unpatched because releases were "too cumbersome", got exploited in the wild by wasabicoordinator.io charging maximum fees before 2.1.0 shipped.
**Scoring the note's framing:**
- "Exploits ignored for years": supported (#5533 plus the list in #14771).
- "Supply chain attack": supported, in the maintainers' own words. Strongest item for wallet verification: a release artifact replaced on GitHub, noticed only by a hash-watch bot.
- "Exploits that de-anonymize": supported, mitigations still partial as of today.
- "OS level code injection": a real bug, but fixed within hours and requires user action. Overstated as a headline.
- "Malicious PRs being merged": nothing cited shows that.
Three of the four items hold up as real marks against the project, one is overstated, and the note's "malicious PRs being merged" claim isn't supported by anything it cites. Item by item:
**Issue #14410 (Mar 16, 2026)**: OS command injection in the URL opener on Linux/macOS. The URL opener builds a shell command by string-concatenating an attacker-controlled URL into xdg-open/open and then executes it through sh -c with no escaping, reachable by pasting a crafted coordinator connection string and clicking "Read More". Bad mark: a shell-out with unescaped input in a privacy wallet, found by Ledger's automated Donjon scanner rather than the team. Mitigating: lontivero merged the fix (#14411) the same day, and it needs user interaction. [github](https://github.com/WalletWasabi/WalletWasabi/issues/14410)
**Issue #5533 (Apr 2021 to Jul 2026)**: filed by Yuval Kogman, one of WabiSabi's designers. Clients verified ownership proofs against a scriptPubKey the coordinator itself supplied, so a coordinator could invent UTXOs, forge proofs, and run tagging or sybil attacks. Stale-botted three times in 2021, auto-closed, reopened, then sat for five years until #14886 (merged Jul 30, 2026) added verification of a random 10% of inputs, and only when an RPC node is connected. Light clients still don't verify. Kogman's reaction on the fix: "wow, amazing that suddenly this became possible".
**PR #14333 (Feb 2026, still a draft)**: not malicious, the opposite. A defensive, client-only mitigation for round-ID equivocation (coordinator feeds each Tor circuit different round parameters, links inputs, anonymity set drops to 1), from Kogman's bitcoindev analysis. Reviewed by Carti-it, tested by Kruwed, false positives fixed. Then lontivero: "This PR is not a priority and it is a bit risky", parked as draft on Mar 3. Kukks shipped the same idea in Kompaktor. Related #14771 (Jul 2026): the maintainer closed a blame-round attack report in 20 minutes as a non-issue, reopened it two days later after Carti-it showed clients don't check blame-round inputs. Partial fix in #14786; m0wer notes the core problem (all clients seeing the same preceding round) is still open and lists six earlier attempts that went nowhere.
**Discussion #13249 (Jul 2024)**, listed twice in the note: the team's own incident disclosure. (1) L7 DDoS on free coordinators. (2) The Windows installer Wasabi-2.0.8.1.msi on GitHub Releases was swapped for a different file via a compromised write-access account. Caught by the external BinaryWatch bot, not internally. Nobody kept a copy, so the payload was never analyzed. (3) A coordinator-fee vulnerability the team admits it already knew about, left unpatched because releases were "too cumbersome", got exploited in the wild by wasabicoordinator.io charging maximum fees before 2.1.0 shipped.
**Scoring the note's framing:**
- "Exploits ignored for years": supported (#5533 plus the list in #14771).
- "Supply chain attack": supported, in the maintainers' own words. Strongest item for wallet verification: a release artifact replaced on GitHub, noticed only by a hash-watch bot.
- "Exploits that de-anonymize": supported, mitigations still partial as of today.
- "OS level code injection": a real bug, but fixed within hours and requires user action. Overstated as a headline.
- "Malicious PRs being merged": nothing cited shows that.