AOSP also doesn't permit setuid or setgid binaries which was the chosen attack vector for exploiting it in the proof of concept exploit. It similarly doesn't permit io_uring, user namespaces and a lot...
@nprofile1q... Note that the exploit itself only depends on the executables behind a "privileged" process being readable by the malicious app, so Android could still be (theoretically, if you managed to bypass selinux) popped if the zygote binary is world-readable. Setuid just makes it trivial to trigger on desktop distributions.
(Not disagreeing overall, just pointing out that a lack of setuid/setgid stuff in particular isn't really a defense against this, as it can easily modify running processes as well)
(Not disagreeing overall, just pointing out that a lack of setuid/setgid stuff in particular isn't really a defense against this, as it can easily modify running processes as well)
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