Damus
Emelia/Emi · 6w
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kyqpqtva8g98fx0fks0pt38vr75tv02t30qd5ev7n5v7fcpl6t44hf7kqzp8d0p Note that the exploit itself only depends on the executables behind a "privileged" pro...
GrapheneOS profile picture
@nprofile1q... That's why we only mentioned it being the chosen attack vector for exploiting it. It's a common attack surface and attack vector for exploits which is why it was removed from Android. It's the SELinux policy disallowing access to AF_ALG outside of dumpstate which blocks exploiting it along with a standard GKI not having the userspace crypto API enabled. AOSP, stock Pixel OS and GrapheneOS don't have the relevant API enabled at all though, which we didn't realize until today.
1
GrapheneOS · 6w
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kyqpq5nwfhpvr80ae6uealglvm3u2ya5efnfx6qwvqt29dtfcprc8sa2qnut2th It seems that CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD has to be enabled as either built-in functionality (common for desktop/server distributions) or a module (also common) in order to exploit the v...