Damus
WalletScrutiny profile picture
WalletScrutiny
@WalletScrutiny

Know your wallet like you made it!

Our goal is to improve the security of Bitcoin wallets by examining products for transparency and potential attacks.

Relays (11)
  • wss://nostr-pub.wellorder.net/ – read & write
  • wss://relay.damus.io/ – read & write
  • wss://nostr-pub.semisol.dev/ – read & write
  • wss://nostr.oxtr.dev/ – read & write
  • wss://nos.lol/ – read & write
  • wss://relay.plebstr.com/ – read & write
  • wss://nostr.mutinywallet.com/ – write
  • wss://relay.primal.net/ – read & write
  • wss://nostr.wine/ – read & write
  • wss://nostr.bitcoiner.social/ – read & write
  • wss://relay.exit.pub/ – read & write

Recent Notes

WalletScrutiny profile picture
We went eagerly to work to analyze this fancy new version of the Bitkey. Sadly our verdict is "no source" as the firmware *cannot be built from the source provided* as one *closed source dependency* is not included in their source code.

In theory they could remedy this in a firmware update.

Bitkey · 4d
Meet the new Bitkey. No seed phrase. Multisig by default. Built-in inheritance. And now, with 100% more screen. See what's new: https://bitkey.world/blog/meet-the-new-bitkey https://blossom.prima...
WalletScrutiny profile picture
The text contradicts the video ;) 100% more is twice as much than before, right? Anyway, lack of a screen was the deal breaker for us on the initial Bitkey, putting it into the verdict "no interface to approve transactions". With a screen that should not be the case anymore.

https://walletscrutiny.com/hardware/blockhww/
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WalletScrutiny profile picture
Playing with new features is fun. This one required to review 1300 products for a list of 27 features which LLMs can do in an hour citing sources. How do you like it? Should we put it live?



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WalletScrutiny profile picture


We will also ask for those juicy tokens although our repo is abysmally starred. We use GitLab after all ...

If you want to support us, star our GitHub mirror anyway, please!

https://github.com/WalletScrutiny/WalletScrutinyCom
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WalletScrutiny profile picture

WalletScrutiny turned 6!

We've come a long way over the years. In the beginning, we only looked into Android wallets - 40 of them - and now we've grown to more than 6000 products across many platforms. Your favorite hardware wallet? We got you covered. Desktop? Probably, too. And desktop is a lot of work as here we found many open source and reproducible products!
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WalletScrutiny profile picture
We’ve been busy but quiet these last months. @btc_remnant improved the site a lot by adding new features around #nostr based build verifications.

We hope other projects in the nostr ecosystem like @franzap @Zapstore will see the value of these verifications and start integrating them. The more products that build on reproducibility, the more users can truly apply the principle of “Don’t trust - verify.” Binary transparency shouldn’t remain a niche feature - it needs to become the default.

If you run software that touches your private keys - be it nostr clients or bitcoin wallets - without binary transparency, only whoever built the binary really knows what code you’re running.



@dannybuntu and @keraliss checked the reproducibility of almost 300 binaries. The 304 verifications by @WalletScrutiny Bot are all the old verifications we had migrated to nostr. And the backlog keeps growing as we cover more and more products with frequent updates.

Are we doing something valuable for the space? A @Spiral grant says yes, and community endorsements confirm it - but the project itself also needs scrutiny.

We recently introduced "verification endorsements":



This is a simple contribution many could provide. If you read a verification and it looked plausible and complete and you trust the author, mark the verification as verified. If you ran the documented commands yourself on your hardware and got to similar results, please endorse the verification!

Even more importantly label verifications as invalid and leave a comment about what's missing when you find issues! Don't be shy!

Our goal is to document all steps such that all mildly technical users (you should be comfortable with a Linux shell) can reproduce our findings. If that's not the case, please provide your feedback and we will improve ✋.

And if you maintain one of the products we check, share your own verification as a template for others!
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Zapstore · 33w
Great work guys. Looking forward to the integration!
Chiefmonkey · 33w
Woohoo nostr:nprofile1qqsq8dgrdhpahqnqgvrur9jd9wfxg9afrsa3rmm4hfk225qeaxm6v2spzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcpzemhxue69uhkummnw3ezuurjd9kh5tn0wfnj7p6k0xn killing it… my man 👌
Rizful.com (zap tester) · 33w
testing zaps for this note… we made six attempts to⚡zap this note, at [email protected], over a period of 1 minute. in each case, we found that your lightning address server did not respond correctly. (the failure point was when we did a get request to your specified callback url: https:...
WalletScrutiny profile picture
The ByBit Hack Report [1] reveals interesting details.

While many blame ETH and its complexities, it's important to note that a combination of circumstances made this attack possible.

But the core issue clearly was a central point of failure. Multi Signature was used but all signers used the same hacked, remote server.

The server was trusted, supposedly running a well audited open source web wallet software but "open source" is not enough as the source run on that compromised server did not match the well audited code.

At WalletScrutiny we so far do not list web wallets because it is hard if not impossible to attest to the integrity of web wallet code when the server can serve different code every other second or depending on your IP address.

We are investigating options to list progressive web apps that give the user more control of what is being run. While standard PWA manifests primarily contain metadata, a security-focused implementation could leverage several mechanisms to establish stronger integrity guarantees:

Extending manifest files with cryptographic commitments to all resources
Implementing Subresource Integrity (SRI) checks to verify each script matches expected hashes
Using a trust-on-first-use (TOFU) signature model where developer keys are stored after initial verification
Creating transparent, user-controlled update processes that display cryptographic verification before applying changes
Such an approach would significantly reduce trust requirements in the server after initial installation, as the PWA could verify the integrity of updates against developer signatures before execution. Static analysis could also differentiate between PWAs with secure update mechanisms versus those with silent automatic updates.

While not eliminating all risks, this model would provide a more verifiable path than traditional web wallets, potentially bringing them closer to the verification standards we apply to other wallet types.

[1] https://docsend.com/view/s/rmdi832mpt8u93s7
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Big Barry Bitcoin · 64w
Ah, sorry I misread, I thought maybe it was an incomplete note actually 😅 I'd stick with attestators. Most likely this will be an icon for most people, like a badge... Badge good. For the rest of us who get curious, using the accurate words is gonna be important, even if we have to google to fi...
WalletScrutiny profile picture
English speakers please help us out here ...

We are close to launching "attestations" where anybody will be able to attest to the reproducibility of binaries. The process is technical and quite involved. Are those who do this ...

* Attestators
* Wittnesses
* Verifiers
* Certifiers

#askNostr
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Big Barry Bitcoin · 64w
What do you need?