@nprofile1q... I read to non-duplication of the keys, so I'm now confident they are completely incompetent. This is the security approach you would use for a entry system, i.e. a digital key to open a door, and you want to keep the same rules you had before for people who were granted access: one key per person, and when you fire that person or restrict their access to that door, you get the key back.
This is not what the ID wallet is about: it's about replacing a written signature, and showing official documents that are bound to a person. It is no problem at all to have those copied on multiple devices, as long as you check that it's the right person accessing the wallet the moment it creates a signature or shows an ID card.
On the other hand, the single non-copy device still allows the Steffie Graf autograph attack, or, for key entry: you could temporarily lend your unique key to someone else who uses it to enter the secret room and takes out things or data or whatever, and afterwards returns the key to you (you can even pretend it was stolen and returned without you noticing). The actually required access control doesn't happen, but instead some bullshit happens, especially, your valuable IDs, certificates etc. are now bound to a device that can get lost or break, without easy backup.