china's position: watching, waiting, calculating.
**immediate:** china depends on strait of hormuz oil (roughly 40% of imports). iran closing it hurts china directly. but china is also iran's biggest...
here's brzezinski on china in four points:
**china is regional, not global.** "china: not global but regional" is the chapter subtitle. in 1997, he saw china as a rising but still regionally confined power — dominant in its sphere but lacking the military reach or ideological appeal to project globally. the US should give china room to be the regional leader while ensuring it doesn't become the eurasian hegemon.
**"far eastern anchor."** brzezinski's proposal: a regionally preeminent china should become america's "far eastern anchor" in power politics, helping foster a stable eurasian equilibrium. the US engages china, integrates it into the global system, and uses the relationship to balance japan and russia. this was the origin of the "strategic partner" language that dominated US-china relations through the 2000s and 2010s.
**the taiwan trap.** brzezinski warned that an american-japanese anti-china coalition could provoke china into conflict and destroy the accommodation. specifically: "the geostrategic accommodation could be undermined by an unwise expansion of american-japanese military cooperation." he mapped the "overlap between a greater china and an american-japanese anti-china coalition" as the collision zone.
**the sinocentric trap.** china's historical self-conception — the celestial empire, the center of the universe — means china will never accept permanent subordination to a non-eurasian power. brzezinski's bet was that this could be deferred by giving china regional dominance and economic integration. the bet held for 25 years. it's now breaking down because china has achieved regional dominance and is pushing for global status — exactly the thing brzezinski said the US must prevent.
for the current cascade: if the US is pinned down in hormuz, ukraine, and the red sea, china's window for taiwan opens. brzezinski saw this directly: keep china as a partner, or face it as a rival while entangled elsewhere. the US picked both — engagement plus containment — and is now entangled.
**china is regional, not global.** "china: not global but regional" is the chapter subtitle. in 1997, he saw china as a rising but still regionally confined power — dominant in its sphere but lacking the military reach or ideological appeal to project globally. the US should give china room to be the regional leader while ensuring it doesn't become the eurasian hegemon.
**"far eastern anchor."** brzezinski's proposal: a regionally preeminent china should become america's "far eastern anchor" in power politics, helping foster a stable eurasian equilibrium. the US engages china, integrates it into the global system, and uses the relationship to balance japan and russia. this was the origin of the "strategic partner" language that dominated US-china relations through the 2000s and 2010s.
**the taiwan trap.** brzezinski warned that an american-japanese anti-china coalition could provoke china into conflict and destroy the accommodation. specifically: "the geostrategic accommodation could be undermined by an unwise expansion of american-japanese military cooperation." he mapped the "overlap between a greater china and an american-japanese anti-china coalition" as the collision zone.
**the sinocentric trap.** china's historical self-conception — the celestial empire, the center of the universe — means china will never accept permanent subordination to a non-eurasian power. brzezinski's bet was that this could be deferred by giving china regional dominance and economic integration. the bet held for 25 years. it's now breaking down because china has achieved regional dominance and is pushing for global status — exactly the thing brzezinski said the US must prevent.
for the current cascade: if the US is pinned down in hormuz, ukraine, and the red sea, china's window for taiwan opens. brzezinski saw this directly: keep china as a partner, or face it as a rival while entangled elsewhere. the US picked both — engagement plus containment — and is now entangled.